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Goodheart: DEA Benchmarking of Safety Culture

With safety management systems (SMS) occupying an increasingly
prominent position in the aviation landscape, the ability to benchmark safety
performance not only against past internal effectiveness but also across similar
organizations seems a necessary element of one of SMS’s foundational themes:
continuous improvement. At present, anecdotal evidence, supported by limited
available research in the field, suggests that few organizations are engaged in
meaningful evaluation and benchmarking of safety performance through an
established methodology. This research investigates a method of evaluating an
organization’s efficiency in creating a robust and positive safety culture using
efficiency frontier estimation, specifically through data envelopment analysis
(DEA).
Introduction
Whether as a byproduct of legislative requirement or as a result of corporate
obligations and responsibility, aviation operators are increasingly implementing
structured safety systems, many in the form of SMS. One of the “essential”
elements of an SMS is a “safety culture” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015,
pp. 3-4). Acknowledging that the notion of safety culture has become widely
accepted, if not comprehensively defined, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (2013) addresses culture in the context of safety as largely an
organizational issue that is supported by and manifested in safety reporting
procedures and practices designed to identify inherent hazards. Safety management
systems seek to create an environment in which organizations move from mere
compliance with minimum regulatory requirements to a performance-based
approach (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009). In a performancebased safety environment, there must be measurable indicators of the capacity for
safety beyond lagging indicators such as accident or injury rate. The logical
inference, consistent with the axiom often attributed to the management consultant
Peter Drucker: “if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it,” is that safety culture
should be the subject of consistent evaluation and measurement as part of attempts
to purposefully manage or shape an organization’s culture. This assertion is
supported by standards such as those promulgated in the International Standard for
Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO), ISO 9001:2000 and ISO 9001:2008, and
AS 9100, all of which contain language referencing the achievement of objectives
and targets, performance measurement and monitoring, and continual
improvement; elements which are arguably central to the concept of safety culture.
Despite the apparent requirement for a quantitative means of measuring and
benchmarking safety culture and performance in aviation organizations, a
commonly accepted approach does not presently exist. This research addresses this
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problem by proposing the development of a mathematical model through the use of
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to provide a quantitative benchmark of efficiency
in establishing safety culture relative to a set of organizations, or from a single
organization based on historical data.
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by introducing a
methodology for assessment of the relative efficiency of organizations in creating
and maintaining a positive safety culture, and as such, the relative effectiveness of
safety programs. The results of this study, when applied to operational data, present
a method to guide organizations in identifying the most appropriate means of
increasing their efficiency in developing a thriving safety culture. It further forms
a foundation on which additional investigation of stochastic measurements, such as
bootstrapped DEA, can be adopted as a measurement system.
Review of Literature
Safety Culture Measurement
Measurement of safety program effectiveness is an onerous task for many
organizations, not only those in the aviation industry. In the context of safety,
traditional performance indicators tend toward a focus on forensic data, often
reporting metrics like accident and incident rate, cost of accidents, insurance
claims, and lost days due to injury (Arezes & Miguel, 2003). Peterson (2001) argues
that safety systems should be evaluated based on a multiple-measures approach,
suggesting that safety programs should be assessed using a minimum of three
measures: accident record; audit scores, and results from perception surveys. In this
context, perception surveys are intended to measure the state of an organization’s
safety culture, an issue which has been the subject of growing attention within the
aviation community (Wiegmann, Zhang, von Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell
Gibbons, 2004).
Understanding safety culture as a science is somewhat of a paradox, given
that it can act “simultaneously as precondition both for safe operations and for the
oversight of incubating hazards” (Pidgeon, 1998, p. 205). This observation is
suggestive of the somewhat abstract status of safety culture as a concept in practice.
It is generally accepted that safety culture operates as a subset of a larger
organizational culture in the same context as identified by Zohar (1980), though
consensus has not necessarily been reached on exactly what the concept is, or on
why it should be the subject of empirical inquiry (Frost, Moore, Louis, Lundberg,
& Martin, 1991). Guldenmund (2010, p.1466) notes that “culture is an intangible,
fuzzy concept encompassing acquired assumptions that is shared among the
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members of a group and that provides meaning to their perceptions and actions and
those of others.”
Schein (2010) generally agrees with Guldenmund’s
characterization of the concept, despite also suggesting that there is no such thing
as a safety culture independent of the more significant organizational construct
(Conklin, 2016). Despite an apparent lack of conceptual specificity, from a practical
standpoint, the study of safety and its related constructs is of apparent importance.
Beus, Payne, Bergman, and Arthur (2010) cite 2008 U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics figures that indicate in the United States in 2007; there were over 5,600
work-related fatalities and over four million nonfatal work injuries. In the
environment of aviation operations and specifically those that occur during ground
operations, the Flight Safety Foundation (n.d.) estimates that around 27,000 ramp
accidents occur worldwide each year, with over 243,000 injuries and a total cost of
at least $10 billion annually. Although they are illustrative as examples of why
safety endures as an area of intense scrutiny, these figures make no provision for
attempting to capture the psychological costs or damage to an organization’s
reputation as the result of an accident (Neal & Griffin, 2002).
Attempts at measuring safety culture have come about in part as a result of
the realization that the forensic, retrospective measurements that have long
characterized attempts to assess safety, such as accident or incident rate, injuries,
or fatalities, provide little support for proactive initiatives (O'Connor, O'Dea,
Kennedy, & Buttrey, 2011). In aviation, as in many industries, actual accident rates
have fallen to so low a level as to make their analysis as a measure of safety
performance almost obsolete. In fact, the measurement of such metrics as accident
rate can be viewed mainly as a reactive response to events that, assuming a
functional safety system, theoretically occur with decreasing frequency (Keren,
Mills, Freeman, & Shelley, 2009). It is often difficult to discern, reliant on such low
base-rate phenomena, whether a lack of injuries or accidents is the result of
organizational measures designed to reduce hazards, or if the absence of injury is
merely a reflection of too short a period of observation (Beus, Payne, Bergman, &
Arthur, 2010). Rather than require that a system reach failure as a means of
identifying latent faults, the concept of measuring safety culture as a leading
indicator of organizational safety performance is appealing from a management
perspective in that it allows the potential for reduction of operational accidents
through a proactive, and even predictive, approach.
While it is generally understood at the theoretical level that a positive
safety culture is an essential element in the prevention of accidents, Wiegmann et
al. (2004) note that no broadly standardized tools exist that can be used to assess
safety culture. Reviewing the extant literature on the subject, however, Wiegmann
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et al. (2004) identify five common themes that serve as indicators of safety culture.
These indicators include organizational commitment, management involvement,
employee empowerment, reward systems, and reporting systems. The importance
of organizational commitment is echoed by Flin, Mearns, O'Connor, and Bryden
(2000), who identified management behaviors and attitudes as an emergent theme
in their own research. Fuller (1997) also addresses organizational commitment as
being a key indicator of safety performance, though not in an aviation-specific
occupational health and safety context. In reviewing assessment instruments in the
UK offshore oil industry, Davies, Spencer, and Dooley (2001) found that of 114
different questionnaire items, 30 related directly to an organizational and
managerial commitment to safety. Management involvement, like organizational
commitment, is also well-supported as an indicator of the health of an
organization’s safety culture. Choudry, Fang, and Mohamed (2007) assert that
management commitment to safety initiatives and compliance is central to the very
definition of safety culture, an observation echoed by Flin et al. (2000). That
comparison of a different culture or climate assessment tools would indicate a
preponderance of questions centered about managers’ safety behaviors is not
surprising, given that supervisors “undoubtedly set the tone and tempo for
organizational atmosphere” including perceptions regarding safety (Flin et al.,
2000, p. 186).
Employee involvement appears in a number of safety culture instruments
(Davies, Spencer, & Dooley, 2001; Fuller, 1997) and its importance is stressed by
Geller (1994), who notes that employees who feel “part of a cohesive group” are
more likely to act empathetically toward their fellow employees, increasing safetycompliant behavior (p.21). Reason (1997) speaks to the matter of rewards,
commenting that rewarding desirable safety behaviors can be a key element of
creating a just culture, which he argues is a necessary component of a functional
safety culture. Reward programs, naturally, rely on the consistent use and formal
documentation; but when these conditions are satisfied, properly designed and
implemented rewards can positively reinforce safety behaviors and safety culture
(Wiegmann et al., 2004). Finally, the assertion by Wiegmann et al. (2004) that a
healthy reporting system is a key indicator of a safety culture is echoed by Reason
(1997), who notes that the rationale for any reporting system is to identify
“organizational factors promoting errors and incidents” (p. 198). In summary, clear
evidence exists within the literature in support of the previously identified
indicators of safety culture performance.
The body of knowledge of safety culture clearly suggests that the construct
of safety culture is still developing, with a litany of definitions and tools for
assessment. However vaguely-specified the concept of culture may be, the evidence
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overwhelmingly supports its importance as a foundation for positive safety
performance. The literature is also far from ambiguous in its support of attempts to
quantify and analyze measures of safety culture as a leading indicator, allowing
organizations to assess safety performance even in the absence of accidents. Data
envelopment analysis is one such method for evaluation and analysis of safety
culture
Use of DEA for Benchmarking
DEA is a robust, nonparametric alternative to regression analysis for
measuring the efficiency of business operations as compared to an estimated
production efficiency frontier (El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, & Hyari, 2010; Ray, 2004).
This frontier is the estimated, but unobserved “geometrical locus of optimal
production plans” (Simar & Wilson, 1998, p. 49). The estimated technical
efficiency of any decision-making unit is the ratio of the distance from the origin
to the unit under evaluation and the distance from the origin to the composite unit
on the efficiency frontier (Barros & Dieke, 2008). Introduced by Farrell in 1957
and refined to form the techniques which serve as the basis for this research by
Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes in a 1978 article, DEA was proposed as a means of
objectively evaluating the efficiency of each participating decision-making unit
(DMU) in a public program. In its original form (hereafter referred to as the CCR
model after Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes), DEA was limited by an assumption of
constant returns to scale; that is, outputs change proportionately to a change in all
inputs (Charnes et al., 1978). Following up on their earlier model, Banker, Charnes,
and Cooper (1984) introduced a more refined set of variables to the DEA ratio that
allowed for variable returns to scale, accommodating contestable market theory
rather than a simple, single output economic model.
The ability of the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) model to
accommodate reallocation of resources to more attractive or more profitable
activities allows for the possibility that resources available within many safety
systems are dynamic and may be apportioned as such. For this research, however;
the inability of the BCC model to accommodate inefficiencies beyond those
attributed to technical or managerial elements makes it an inappropriate technique
as compared to the CCR model, which includes estimation of scale efficiencies,
combining estimates into a single value while assuming constant returns to scale
(Barros & Dieke, 2008). As opposed to methods such as stochastic frontier analysis
(SFA), DEA was chosen in this study because, unlike in SFA, it requires neither a
large sample size nor that the functional form for estimation of cost or production
technologies be pre-specified, a characteristic that limits flexibility and makes SFA
ill-suited to the research at hand (Assaf & Josiassen, 2011).
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El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, and Hyari (2010) undertook a study to benchmark
the safety performance of construction contractors in Jordan. The El-Mashaleh et
al. (2010) benchmarking study sought to compare the efficiency of utilization of
safety-related expenses with safety expenses as a percent of total revenue as input
variables and accident count as output variables. The authors acknowledge a
limitation of their technique implicitly by suggesting a separate analysis of variance
(ANOVA) be utilized to further examine differences between contractors. This
study demonstrates that safety performance can be benchmarked against
homogenous operators as well as internal measures evaluated over time through the
use of DEA. In a similar vein, Beriha, Patnaik, and Mahapatra (2011) studied the
applicability of DEA as a tool for the evaluation of safety performance in Indian
organizations in the construction and manufacturing sectors.
The use of DEA in production and technical efficiency estimation is due in
large part to its ability to compare DMUs directly to peer organizations while
avoiding the many assumptions inherent in similar techniques such as stochastic
frontier analysis (Ray, 2004). Adding to the applicability of DEA as a tool for safety
benchmarking is that inputs need not be expressed as homogenous units; a trait that
is particularly appropriate given that influences of safety performance may occur
across varying levels of measurement. Despite its apparent applicability to
benchmarking, DEA is not without its limitations. First, because it is an extreme
point technique, DEA is particularly susceptible to measurement and sampling
errors (Simar & Wilson, 1998). Second, DEA as a method is only concerned with
performance relative to the sample. If for instance, none of the subject organizations
is efficient relative to a theoretical maximum value, DEA will only reflect relative
efficiency and not the gap between reality and how well an organization could
ideally be performing. Finally, and of particular interest in this study, DEA is
considered a nonparametric, or deterministic, technique. As such, it does not
produce standard errors and makes hypothesis testing extremely difficult (Ray,
2004; Simar & Wilson, 1998). With this in mind, the present study was designed
as a first step toward demonstrating the applicability of DEA to safety culture
benchmarking in aviation, with the secondary goal of illustrating the need, along
with suggestions for future directions, for expansions to native DEA techniques that
allow stochastic efficiency measures.
Method
This research assumed a two-phase approach for model development. In the
first phase, a native, nonparametric DEA model was developed and tested. In the
second phase, the primary, native DEA model was used as a basis for the limited
expansion of the model into stochastic, double-bootstrapped DEA form. In this
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study, each organization whose measurement data are used as input information for
DEA was considered a DMU. In a parallel use of the model, it is possible for an
individual organization to self-audit and track performance at regular intervals
considering each measurement taken over time as a separate DMU. In order to
avoid inconsistencies in the measurement of production output, in this case, the
previously-discussed indicators of safety culture, this study proposes to use a single
conventional cultural measurement instrument for all DMUs. For the purposes of
this research, the cultural survey described and implemented by von Thaden,
Wiegmann, Mitchell, Sharma, and Zhang (2003) has been identified for its
harmony with the five aforementioned cultural traits. To ensure that input and
output variables are correctly identified as well as relevant to the intended
efficiency estimate, the methodology outlined by Simar and Wilson (2001) was
employed.
Variables in a DEA model represent the conversion of inputs, such as
resources or investment, into outputs, such as specific performance measures by the
DMUs under study (El-Mashaleh, Rababeh, & Hyari, 2010). In the context of the
present research, input and output variables are different from those that typify
DEA models which aim to estimate financial or production efficiency. In early
stages of this research, a number of variables for potential inclusion in the model
were identified, including: annual safety budget (per capita or as a percentage of
total budget); normalized lost-time injuries; normalized aircraft incidents;
normalized hazard report submissions; mean-time-to-resolution of hazard reports;
count of overdue hazard resolutions; workers’ compensation experience modifier;
aircraft and general liability insurance loss ratio; and standardized scores derived
from the selected cultural measurement instrument or its subsections. While the
inclusion of many input or output variables could arguably increase the fidelity of
the measurement, one limitation of DEA in this regard is the tendency for the
number of variables to be too great relative to the sample size (Ray, 2005).
To alleviate this concern, variables were checked in accordance with the
methods proposed by Jenkins and Anderson (2003) for confirmation of input or
output status and were aggregated to the extent practicable. The simplified output
variable is the composite score of the von Thaden et al. (2003) cultural
measurement instrument previously discussed. Input variables were limited to
include measures selected to represent three facets of investment: capital,
personnel, and leadership. Each of these variables relates back to the factors
addressed by von Thaden et al. (2003). Table 1 summarizes the variable definitions
and assumptions used in the context of this research.
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Table 1
Variable Descriptions and Measures
Variable

Input/
Output
Percent of total Input
annual expenses
spent on safety

%
FTEs Input
dedicated
to
safety positions

Mean hours of Input
safety training
per
employee/year

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss4/9

Description

Measure

Measures the financial
commitment of the
organization to safety. The
higher the metric, the
higher the share of its
expenses that an
organization devotes to
safety; and thus, the higher
the financial commitment
to safety. Computed as the
ratio of annual expense on
safety to the total expenses
of the organization.
This metric measures the
human resource
commitment of the
organization to safety. The
higher the metric, the
higher the share of total
workforce that an
organization devotes to
safety and thus, the higher
the human resource
commitment to safety.
Computed as the ratio of
the total full-time
equivalents (FTE)
dedicated to safety to the
total FTEs of the
organization.
Measures the training
commitment of the
organization to safety. The
higher the metric, the more
safety training employees
receive on average.

Generally, the metric will
be computed from actual
annual expenditures.
However, it may also be
computed from budgeted
annual expenses.

The use of FTE accounts
for resources partially
dedicated to safety, such
as a pilot who in addition
to flying duties also
serves for 10% of work
time on the union’s safety
committee. Such a
resource would be
counted as .1 of an FTE
dedicated to safety. The
metric can be computed
for any given point in
time (snapshot), or
averaged over a period of
time.
Computed as total hours
of safety training received
by employees in the
organization during a
year divided by the
average total number of
employees in the
organization during that
year.
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Variable
Safety
prominence in
leadership
communication

Safety culture

Input/
Output
Input

Description

Measure

This metric measures the
organization’s top
leadership commitment to
safety. The higher the
metric, the more prominent
safety is in top leadership
communication.

Output

von Thaden et al. (2003)
culture assessment
instrument.

Computed by scoring
each top leadership
message to employees for
the prominence of safety,
and averaging the scores
over leadership messages
sent that year. Scoring is
based on the following
point system: 0 for no
mention of safety; 1 for
single-line mention of
safety (e.g., "Work safe
and take care of each
other), 2 for dedicating
one paragraph to safety, 3
for dedicating more than
one paragraph but not the
entire message to safety,
and 4 for dedicating the
whole message to safety.
Composite safety culture
survey score.

The methodology proposed in this study has a strong foundation in the CCR
model previously discussed, and it follows the linear programming model also used
by Beriha, Patnaik, and Mahapatra (2011). This model, adapted from Charnes,
Cooper, and Rhodes (1978), is a maximization of the ratio of weighted outputs to
weighted inputs subject to the constraint that the equivalent ratios for every
decision-making unit (DMU) are equal to or less than unity (p. 430). The input and
outputs variables are represented by yrj and xij and the variable weights determined
by the solution are represented as ur and vi. This model is the basic foundation of
DEA, and it aggregates measures of efficiency into a single value. There are two
ways to state the ratio in the “ratio-form” or DEA model of technical efficiency
(Cooper, Seiford, & Zhu, 2011). In the output-oriented form, the ratio considered
is the ratio of outputs to inputs, where a higher ratio corresponds to higher
efficiency. In the input-oriented form, the ratio considered is the reciprocal ratio,
namely the ratio of inputs to outputs. In this case, a lower ratio corresponds to
higher efficiency. For this research, the output-oriented CCR model was chosen as
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a means of efficiency comparisons along a frontier based upon best practices or
optimal implementation of cultural interventions.
The Beriha et al. model (2011) is a functional one and is nearly identical to
the original CCR formulation. In the context of this study, the model is formulated
in virtually the same arrangement, though written in ratio form as in Equation 1.
max ℎ𝑒 (𝑢, 𝑣) = ∑ 𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟𝑒 / ∑ 𝑣𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑒
𝑟∈𝑅

𝑖∈𝐼

s.t.:
(1)
∑ 𝑢𝑟 𝑦𝑟𝑑 / ∑ 𝑣𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑 ≤ 1 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷
𝑟∈𝑅

𝑖∈𝐼

𝑢𝑟 ≥ 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼
Where:

he is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e
which is evaluated,
ur is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r,
vi is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i,
yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d,
xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d,
R is the set of all outputs,
I is the set of all inputs, and
D is the set of all DMUs.

To select a unique solution, the CCR model is transformed into a linear
programming problem using the transformation by Charnes and Cooper (1962),
which selects the representative solution in which the weighted sum of inputs
equals unity. Equation 2 shows the resulting linear programming problem for the
output-oriented CCR model.
max 𝐸𝑒 (𝜇) = ∑ 𝜇𝑟 𝑦𝑟𝑒
𝑟∈𝑅

s.t.:
(2)
∑ 𝜇𝑟 𝑦𝑟𝑑 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑑 ≤ 0 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷
𝑟∈𝑅

𝑖∈𝐼

∑ 𝑣𝑖 𝑥𝑖𝑒 = 1
𝑖∈𝐼
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𝜇𝑟 ≥ 0 ∀𝑟 ∈ 𝑅
𝑣𝑖 ≥ 0 ∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐼
Where:

Ee is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e
which is evaluated,
µr is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r,
vi is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i,
yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d,
xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d,
R is the set of all outputs,
I is the set of all inputs, and
D is the set of all DMUs.

This linear programming model maximizes the sum of weighted outputs of
the DMU that is being evaluated. The first constraint ensures that for each DMU
the sum of weighted output is smaller or equal than the sum of weighted inputs.
Through this constraint, a relationship between inputs and outputs is enforced. The
second constraint ensures that the sum of weighted input for the DMU that is being
evaluated is equal to one. Through this constraint, the uniqueness of a solution with
maximum technical efficiency scores of one is enforced. The final two constraints
ensure that the weights are non-negative.
The linear programming model shown in Equation 2 needs to be solved
once for each DMU. To enable simpler processing of the model for the complete
set of DMUs in commercial solver software, the researcher extended the model into
a form in which the efficiency of all DMUs can be solved within one model run.
Equation 3 shows the extended model.
max ∑ 𝐸𝑒 (𝜇) = ∑ ∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑟𝑒
𝑒∈𝐷

𝑒∈𝐷 𝑟∈𝑅

s.t.:
(3)
∑ 𝜇𝑟𝑒 𝑦𝑟𝑑 − ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑒 𝑥𝑖𝑑 ≤ 0
𝑟∈𝑅

∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑒 ∈ 𝐷

𝑖∈𝐼

∑ 𝑣𝑖𝑒 𝑥𝑖𝑒 = 1

∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷

𝑖∈𝐼

𝜇𝑟𝑒 ≥ 0
𝑣𝑖𝑒 ≥ 0
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Where:

Ee is the objective function and represents the efficiency of DMU e
which is evaluated,
µre is a decision variable and represents the weight of output r for the
evaluation of DMU e,
vie is a decision variable and represents the weight of input i for the
evaluation of DMU e,
yrd is the observed value of output r for DMU d,
xid is the observed value of input i for DMU d,
R is the set of all outputs,
I is the set of all inputs, and
D is the set of all DMUs.

This linear programming model maximizes the sum of weighted outputs of
all DMUs rather than just one. The constraints are similar as in Equation 2, with
the difference that they now apply for all DMUs rather than for just the one DMU
that is being evaluated. As such, the number of constraints increases as a multiple
of the number of DMUs in the set. Once populated with input data, the model was
computed within the software program LINGO, version 13.0.
Results and Discussion
Because of limitations on the accessibility of safety culture survey data as
well as direct measurement data for the proposed model variables, the model was
tested using randomized, contrived data. The nature of the cultural measurement
instrument suggested for use in this model made it incompatible with the timeframe
imposed upon this study. As such results are limited by their ability to inform
generalizable conclusions. Yet these remain useful as a means of testing the model
as an incremental step toward demonstrating the applicability of DEA as a safety
culture benchmarking tool.
Simulated Data and Testing
To test the model in the absence of real experimental data, an artificial set
of test data were developed. Testing was completed in three phases. In the first
phase, artificial test data were evaluated both through the researcher’s algorithm
and a step-by-step manual computation based on a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet to
ensure proper functioning of the algorithm. Data for five organizations were
purposively synthesized with apparent differences in the input and output values,
and the results from both the researcher’s algorithm and the step-by-step
computation were compared for consistency in results, shown in Table 3. In the
second phase, test cases of artificial data with known efficiency ranking between
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organizations were created and evaluated in the model to ensure the model would
provide the correct ranking of efficiency. Finally, testing of the model was
completed using random, simulated data. In this way, the model was both verified
to ensure computational accuracy and validated to demonstrate that performance
was as expected given both purposive and random input selection. A primary
limitation to testing of the model is that the literature indicates that no analog
measures to the proposed model currently exist. As such, this study takes on some
exploratory characteristics. Rather than attempt comparison of model results to an
established measure, testing of the model was limited to simulated data and
evaluation of whether the results were logically supported by input data.
Descriptive statistics of data used in the first phase of testing are presented in Table
2. Excel computation of the DEA problem resulted in the scores for each of the five
phase one test organizations as given in Table 3.
Table 2
Test Phase 1 Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable
% of budget
% of FTEs
Hours of annual training
Top leadership message score
Safety score

Mean Standard Deviation
0.87
0.57
1.41
0.63
19.40
7.47
1.48
0.43
4.32
1.37

Min
0.35
0.75
12.00
1.00
2.80

Max
1.80
2.30
30.00
2.10
6.30

Table 3
DEA Efficiency Estimates for Phase 1 Testing
Organization
A
B
C
D
E

DEA Estimate
1.00
1.00
0.98
1.00
1.00

The test data were evaluated in the researcher’s algorithm for the DEA
model. The results from the authors’ algorithm were consistent with those from the
step-by-step manual computation, providing an initial verification of the accuracy
of the researcher’s algorithm. For second phase testing, artificial data for test DMUs
were created. Table 4 shows the artificial test data. Table 5 shows the relative
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efficiency expected from the DEA for this test set of data, as well as the efficiencies
computed from DEA. This test verified that for predictable situations, that
researcher’s algorithm provides accurate, logical efficiency rankings.
The third phase, randomized test dataset included data for the four input
variables and the one output variable for 14 organizations. The number of test
organizations was limited to 14 due to an a priori testing constraint limit of 250,
and 14 organizations with 4 inputs and 1 output resulted in 225 constraints. The
input data were generated by choosing at random from a normal distribution, with
lower-bound truncation at zero for values that fell below zero for all variables,
upper-bound truncation at 75 for percentage input values, and upper-bound
truncation for top leadership message at 4. The parameters of the normal
distribution are shown in Table 6.
Table 4
Phase 2 Test Data
Inputs
Org. %
Budget
A
1
B
0
C
0
D
0
E
0

%
FTEs
1
0
0
0
0

Training
Hours
1
15
30
60
45

Leadership
Messages
1
0
0
0
0

Output
Safety
Culture
7
3
3
6
3

For each of the 14 test organizations, a value for the output variable safety
culture score was generated based on the four input variables of each organization
and a random noise. Equation 4 describes the formula used to generate the safety
culture score.
[safety culture] = 7 – 7 / (1 + .6 * [% of budget]
+ .4 * [% of FTEs]
(4)
+ .02 [training hours]
+ .4 [leadership message])
+ε

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss4/9

14

Goodheart: DEA Benchmarking of Safety Culture

Table 5
Expected and Actual Efficiency Ranking
Expected
Org. Rank Rationale
A
1
Highest possible outcome with lowest
possible inputs ensures this organization
lies on the frontier
B
1
Highest possible outcome to input ratio
with only training input, ensures this
organization lies on the frontier as input
mix different than A
C
3
Second highest possible outcome to input
ratio with only training input
D
3
Linear multiple (2x) of C for both inputs
and outputs
E
5
Lowest possible outcome to input ratio
with only training input

DEA evaluation
Efficiency Rank
1.00
1

1.00

1

.50

3

.50

3

.33

5

Table 6
Phase 3 Input Variable Parameters
Input variable
% of budget
% of FTEs
Hours of annual training
Top leadership message score

Mean
1.0
2
32
1.75

Standard Deviation
.5
.75
6
.5

This equation was developed to ensure that safety culture increases with increasing
values for the input variable and that the mean safety culture score was 5.1,
consistent with prior research validating the selected measurement instrument
(Wiegmann, von Thaden, Mitchell, Sharma, & Zhang, 2003). Each input variable
value range was developed by researcher consensus based on anecdotal experience.
The random noise ε, which is randomly drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviation 0.3, ensured that efficiencies varied between different
organizations. To ensure the safety score values were valid on the scale of the
variable, the values were truncated at a lower bound of 1 and an upper bound of 7.
Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the test data. The full test data is
reproduced in Table 8. The safety score mean of 4.83 is about .5 standard deviations
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lower than the design target of 5.1. This difference is due to sampling, and these
data were found to be suitable for testing of the model.
Figure 1 shows a plot of the relative technical efficiency scores compared
to safety culture for the 14 test organizations. It is important to note that some of
the relatively most efficient organizations have relatively low safety culture scores.
Organization G has the overall lowest safety culture score of 3.93. However, it is
also among the efficient organizations. This shows that organization G is able to
efficiently use very few inputs and still achieve a safety culture score of 3.93.
Table 7
Phase 3 Test Variable Descriptive Statistics
Variable
% of budget
% of FTEs
Hours of annual training
Top leadership message score
Safety score

Mean Standard Deviation
1.19
0.50
1.79
0.50
23.32
5.72
1.61
0.39
5.13
0.71

Min
0.30
0.88
13.52
1.11
3.93

Max
1.98
2.40
32.48
2.23
6.21

Table 8
Phase 3 Test Data
Inputs
Org. %
budget
A
0.81
B
1.27
C
1.57
D
1.76
E
1.71
F
1.98
G
0.30
H
0.50
I
1.32
J
1.13
K
1.14
L
0.76
M
0.80
N
1.55

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss4/9

%
FTEs
2.00
2.18
1.49
1.97
1.31
2.40
0.89
2.26
2.18
2.05
0.88
1.36
2.08
1.96

Trng.
hours
24.69
28.54
21.11
25.20
24.36
19.67
13.78
19.35
13.52
31.54
26.66
32.48
24.69
20.94

Leadership
msg.
2.09
1.35
2.09
1.83
1.40
1.44
1.18
1.11
1.57
1.16
1.32
2.04
2.23
1.68

Output
Safety
Culture
5.51
4.35
5.37
5.97
5.83
4.37
3.93
4.53
5.67
6.21
4.76
5.25
5.49
4.54

Efficiency
0.76
0.68
0.87
0.84
1.00
0.74
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.84
0.73
0.71
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Figure 1. Relative technical efficiency scores versus safety culture.

Bootstrapped DEA
As discussed earlier, one of the primary limitations of DEA is that it is an
inherently deterministic model, and it does not make allowances for measurement
error in the derivation of efficiency scores. As an extension of the technique
previously outlined, bootstrapping allows for the flexibility of DEA to be
maintained while allowing for statistical properties of efficiency estimates to be
determined. Bootstrapping in the context of DEA was introduced by Simar and
Wilson in 1998 based on earlier work introducing the bootstrap by Efron in 1979;
and it has since been refined to represent an established technique, as is described
in their 2007 article. At its core, bootstrapping is a technique based on the idea of
repeated simulation of the data-generating process (DGP) (Simar & Wilson, 1998).
Bootstrapping repeatedly resamples the original estimator in order to mimic the
sampling distribution missing from deterministic methods. Because the asymptotic
distribution in DEA is not only difficult to determine, but also prone to error,
bootstrapping is used to estimate the sample properties without the need for fully
specifying the DGP (the sample serves as the population from which estimates are
treated as valid samples). In their seminal 2007 work, Simar and Wilson describe
the advantages of their bootstrapping strategy and test it through a series of Monte
Carlo simulations. Simar and Wilson (2007) address concerns regarding the
sensitivity of nonparametric frontier approach to outliers and to the inclusion of

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017

17

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 9

stochastic noise, both of which are efficiently suppressed by the doublebootstrapping technique (Murillo-Zamorano, 2004; Simar & Wilson, 2007). In
short, bootstrapping allows for statistical inferences to be made within the domain
of DEA, a traditionally nonparametric technique.
This study suggests that the concept of performance may be extended to
those measures that make up a composite evaluation of safety culture. The literature
supports that by using a safety culture assessment instrument to gain performance
inputs, DEA can be applied to form a mathematical model that estimates the
efficiency of organizational safety culture with respect to peer organizations. By
mitigating some of the limitations of traditional DEA and allowing for stochastic
analysis, bootstrapped DEA is an appropriate and feasible methodological approach
to the issue of benchmarking safety culture in aviation organizations taking into
consideration the compounding effects of environmental determinants of
efficiency. Further discussion along these lines is included in the results and
conclusions that follow.
Stochastic Model

As an expansion of the previously discussed native DEA model, a stochastic
form of the same is presented here following the methods outlined by Simar and
Wilson (2007). To allow bootstrapping, an output-oriented DEA efficiency
estimator must first be calculated as was illustrated by the linear programming
model in equation 3. The efficiency estimator hereafter referred to as 𝛿̂𝑖 , can now
be used in a two-stage bootstrapping procedure. Even a cursory review of the
relevant literature illustrates that in many cases of bootstrapping, a single bootstrap
is utilized in conjunction with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of DEA
estimates on covariates treated as environmental variables (Simar & Wilson, 2007).
Equation 5 illustrates a common model by which this is accomplished.
(5)

𝛿̂𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖

This method presents a problem in that serial correlation is almost always
present in DEA efficiency scores, given that calculating an efficiency estimate of
one DMU necessarily requires an evaluation of all other DMUs in the subject set.
This correlation renders normal regression analysis invalid. In addition,
environmental variables as previously described are also correlated with the input
and output variables used in the model, leading to biased results, especially in small
sample sizes (Assaf & Josiassen, 2011). To circumvent these issues, the double
bootstrap proves well suited. As outlined by Simar and Wilson (2007) and as in
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Coelli, Perelman, and Romano (1999), Equation 6 represents a second-stage
estimation to determine what factors contribute to variation in production
efficiency. Size and accident rate for each DMU are proposed as appropriate
environmental actors for second-stage estimation and analysis.
(6)
Where:

𝛿̂𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝛿̂𝑖𝑡 represents the CCR DEA efficiency estimates,
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable wherein organizations of greater than 50
employees, are represented by 1, otherwise, 0,
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the annual normalized accident rate,
and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is random error representing statistical noise as was included
in the previously described native DEA model.

This model, once populated with appropriate data, can then be double
bootstrapped as described and first- and second-stage estimation values can,
assuming that second-stage estimation variables conform to expectations of
constant returns to scale, be evaluated by truncated regression (Barros & Dieke,
2008; Simar & Wilson, 2007). In this way, a stochastic evaluation of the effect of
the first- and second-stage may be evaluated in terms of both statistical and practical
significance.
Practical Implications
In terms of practical implementation, it is intended that the results of the
model presented here be used as a tool for identifying standardized practices as well
as the most efficient use of limited resources earmarked for safety initiatives
designed to improve safety culture. The absence of accidents, for instance, is not
an absolute indicator of either effectiveness or efficiency, and the model presented
in this study provides a more proactive, granular approach to the evaluation of
particular safety-related initiatives in terms of the efficient use of finite resources
toward a focus on the most effective interventions. Of interest in the model
proposed here is to note to readers that efficiency and effectiveness may exist as
separate constructs. Organizations G and J, as examples, are both operating
efficiently, though their safety culture total scores, given in Table 4, are entirely
different. This disparity is the impetus behind benchmarking of safety and
illustrates the need for further empirical investigation of organizational factors
contributing to safety.
As a measure of efficiency improvement over time, this model allows an
organization to evaluate how different budgetary allocation or cultural intervention
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strategies affect actual output in terms of efficiency of use. At present, such
evaluation of safety initiatives is generally poorly specified and as previously
discussed is in large part based on forensic and imprecise measures such as accident
rate. The double bootstrap procedure suggested herein allows for a more robust
evaluation of estimation variables, including those related to technical, managerial,
and environmental conditions. Reasoning counterfactually about the efficiency of
safety investments, as this method allows, is a substantial step forward in not only
understanding the role of organizational safety culture but in the purposeful
maturation of culture.
Future Research Directions
As was discussed previously, native DEA techniques are particularly
susceptible to errors in both measurements and in sampling. It is a deterministic
technique, and as such is limited in that native DEA results cannot be extended to
hypothesis testing. Instead, stochastic analysis must be achieved using individual
input and output measures, and not the DEA results themselves. The results realized
in this study are sufficient to inform the development of further models that may
address the restrictions inherent to native DEA as a single-solution benchmarking
tool. Further research would likely be best focused on the sequential model
expansion proposed herein, and on potential means of counterfactual reasoning
within such models. For example, the model presented here requires extensive
validation of variable selection, a process that must require data unavailable within
the scope of the present study. Results from this study could be used as points of
comparison for future research as well, and along those lines, the present study
would benefit from the availability of actual organization data.
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